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Abstract
The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires
an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is
a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated
value. In this environment, the planner’s optimal contract avoids states with high probability of
expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable
informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted
revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended to
incorporate government subsidies, unenforceable investment effort and political moral hazard,
and the general thrust of the results described above is preserved.
Keywords: Taxation, mining, rent extraction, royalty, non-renewable natural resource, present-
value-of-revenue auction.
JEL classification: Q33, Q34, Q38, H21, H25.We have nationalized copper by unanimous decision of Parliament,
where the parties supporting the government are in the minority. We
want the whole world to understand that we have not conﬁscated the
large foreign mining companies. In keeping with a constitutional
amendment, we have redressed an historical iniquity by subtracting
from the compensation due to the ﬁrms, the proﬁts accrued since
1956 that are in excess of a 12% annual rate.
The proﬁts of some of the nationalized ﬁrms were so outrageous that
when applying the reasonable annual proﬁt rate of 12%, their
compensations were subject to substantial deductions.
Salvador Allende: Speech to the United Nations, December 4th, 1972.
1 Introduction
Natural resource rich countries are prone to expropriating investors in those sectors in good
times, when prices of resources are considerably above the long run average price. The temp-
tation for governments is large, because in the future prices will be lower, and thus any punish-
ment by investors in terms of reduced future investment is low relative to the immediate gains
of expropriation. Moreover, the short time frame of democratic governments also leads to high
discounting of future losses of investment. Apart from these considerations, proﬁts under a bo-
nanzamaybesohighthatpopulistpressuresforredistributioncancompelgovernmentstoact.
Hence in recent years, high commodity prices have led to outright expropriation or to sectoral
tax increases, which also amount to a form of expropriation.2
This type of behavior is specially common in industries with large sunk investments, such
as oil and mining. These plants normally operate at capacity, except when prices are so low
that they shut down. Therefore, it is specially galling for the public when proﬁts rise substan-
tially, without change in output, solely because of higher international prices. If the investors
are foreign, and have little political support, it seems to the public that they are exploiting the
generous conditions offered them.3 In addition, the investments are sunk, so it appears to be a
case of there being little or no cost to the government from expropriation.
We therefore observe a cycle in which, when prices are high, investors receive less than the
amounts stipulated in their contracts, and when prices are low, they are offered specially fa-
vorable conditions to induce them to invest. These special conditions are not credible, since
2“Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa has signed a decree giving the state a greater share of proﬁts from foreign
oilcompaniesworkinginhiscountry. Hesaidthe50%ofwindfalloilproﬁtsstipulatedinalawpassedlastyearwas
not enough, and the state should now receive 99%.”, BBC News, October 5th, 2007. “Algeria is to levy a windfall tax
on the proﬁts of oil companies, as it tries to retain more of the economic beneﬁts of its recent energy boom.[...]
From early 2007, proﬁts accrued by ﬁrms when prices are above $30 a barrel will be taxed at between 5% and 50%
depending on total output.”, BBC News, October 15th, 2006.
3See epigraph, corresponding to a previous cycle of high prices and expropriation.
1investors realize that they will be expropriated –or at least receive smaller proﬁts than would
have obtained under the original contracts– when times are good again. The resulting policies
lead to lower investment than under certainty, and of a stop-go variety, which is inefﬁcient.4
The current boom in natural resources is an example: Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia have
expropriated investors, Peru imposed “voluntary contributions” worth US$757 million, and
Chile (before the rise in prices) imposed a small royalty. Even developed countries have used
windfall taxes (the US imposed an oil windfall tax post-1973) or increasing royalties (Australia,
Canada and the UK) after perceived increases in proﬁts in the natural resource sector.
The standard mining contract does not provide for the possibility of expropriation. From
the point of view of the foreign investor, it is an additional risk of investment. Attempts have
been made to introduce proﬁt sharing mechanisms to reduce the temptation to expropriate,
but in practice they are often abused by transfer pricing, creating a negative effect on public
opinion, which in turn increases the probability of expropriation.
Hence it appears that the appropriate contracts for this type of environment are different
from those currently in use. It is possible to describe hypothetical scenarios where all parties,
including the foreign investor, are better off if the contract is such that taxes paid by the ﬁrm are
highly progressive, since this may lower the probability of expropriation in high price scenarios
(by reducing the gains from expropriation), while increasing the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm,
due to the reduced risk of expropriation. And even if ﬁrm’s rents are dissipated through some
competitive mechanism, the deadweight loss associated with expropriations may be reduced
through such a contract.
The object of this paper is to present a family of models that formalizes this intuition by
proposing an environment in which expropriations cannot be ruled out, due to ex post political
pressures. We derive general conditions that characterize the optimal ex ante contract, in the
sense that the government maximizes social welfare under the threat of expropriation. We also
show how the optimal contract can be implemented using a competitive auction.
In our model, the government has a natural resource project that requires upfront sunk in-
vestment,asinthecaseofaminingoroilextractionproject. Sincetheproblemofexpropriation
usually arises with foreign investment, proﬁts are not included (or have a lower weight) in the
welfare function of the planner, and as the good is not consumed at home but exported, the
government only cares about the revenues it can obtain from the project.
4“Zambia, meanwhile, planstocashinonthestratosphericpriceofcopperbyrenegotiatingthegenerousterms
it gave to foreign ﬁrms when it privatised its copper mines in 2000. Then the price was low. Although these in-
vestors rescued an industry close to collapse, Zambia now wants to increase royalties and other taxes. [...] Gov-
ernments intent on reworking contracts or imposing new taxes clearly feel that they have the upper hand at the
moment. When prices were depressed and proﬁts scarce, foreign ﬁrms had to be lured with generous terms that
now rankle.” The Economist, Oct 4th 2007.
2The present value of raw proﬁts of the project (i.e., if we disregard the possibility of expro-
priation) depends on the price, which is random, so proﬁts are described by a probability den-
sity.5 In a dynamic model, governments are replaced by newer governments that do not nec-
essarily respect the commitments of previous governments, or they may be subject to political
pressures that make them renege on previous agreements to not expropriate, or to renegotiate
natural resource contracts. We deal with these sources of dynamic inconsistency in our model
via a reduced form: we assume that there is a predeﬁned function, known to all parties, of the
probability of expropriation, which depends on the ﬁrm’s present discounted proﬁts.6
We assume that the expected value of proﬁts in each state (i.e., given the possibility of ex-
propriation) increases with raw proﬁts, but at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, we assume that
expropriations cause a deadweight loss that is proportional to the ﬁrm’s loss, i.e. to the dif-
ference between contractual and effective proﬁts. This deadweight loss can be interpreted as
a measure of the country’s respect of property and contract law. In a country in which con-
tracts are broken continually, there is little trust in them and ﬁrms cannot impose a large cost
on government when they are expropriated. On the other hand, countries where contract and
property rights are respected are those where ﬁrms can impose a large cost on the government
when they are expropriated.
The question for the planner is to determine a contractual proﬁt schedule for the ﬁrm that
depends on the present value of raw proﬁts and the expropriation function, subject to a partic-
ipation constraint: given the known expropriation probability, the investor must at least break
even on its investment. Initially, we assume that there is no unobservable effort the ﬁrm can
exert to increase proﬁts (i.e., there is no moral hazard in effort), or to reduce the probability of
expropriation (no political moral hazard).
Inthesimplesetupwithoutmoralhazard, weshowthatacontractthateliminatesallriskfor
theﬁrm,whilegrantingitnorents,isoptimalinthecaseinwhichoperatingproﬁtscoverinvest-
ment costs in all states of demand in ﬁnite time (high demand scenario). The optimal contract
then entails no expropriation. On the other hand, if the project cannot be ﬁnanced using a
transfer schedule that avoids expropriations, a case which we refer to as an intermediate de-
mand scenario, the optimal contract is characterized by a cap on the ﬁrm’s present discounted
revenues. This cap is not binding in low demand states, and the ﬁrm collects all revenue in
those states. By contrast, in high demand states all revenues above the cap accrue to the gov-
ernment. The threshold is chosen so that ex-ante expected proﬁts, net of expropriation, are
5Though proﬁts are unobservable in general, we denote by operating proﬁts the difference between the rev-
enues of the ﬁrm and costs that are based on observable variables. These are the proﬁts that are pre-speciﬁed in
the initial contract.
6In general terms, this probability should depend on institutional aspects of the country such as the degree of
belief in the sanctity of contracts, the impact of public pressure on governments, etc.
3zero.7 In an ordinary natural resource contract, the ﬁrm would receive all of the upside in the
good states, making it prone to expropriation. In the optimal contract, there is an upper bound
to the operating proﬁts of the ﬁrm, and this reduces, by the optimal amount, the probability of
expropriation in high demand states. Note that this is equivalent to a windfall tax, because in
thegoodstates,theresidualrevenuesgotothegovernment.8 Bothinthehighandintermediate
demand cases the optimal contract can be implemented via an auction where ﬁrms bid on the
maximum present value of operating proﬁts they would obtain in the good states of the world,
and the minimum bid wins the auction. The planner does not need to know the expropriation
probability nor the ﬁrm’s sunk investment cost in order to implement this auction.9
We extend the model in several directions. First we consider the possibility that the govern-
ment provides subsidies in the bad states of the world. Second, we extend the model to the case
of moral hazard in effort, i.e., when the ﬁrm can exert costly effort that increases the probability
of the good states of the world (the price distribution mentioned above now becomes a distri-
bution of net revenue where marginal costs depend on effort exerted by the investor up front).
Finally, we consider the possibility that the ﬁrm can exert effort to reduce the probability of ex-
propriation (by lobbying, targeted social expenditures, etc) and consider the optimal contract
in that case.10
Subsidies in bad states are not unusual in countries characterized by a probability of expro-
priation in the good states of the world. These subsidies usually cost society more than they
beneﬁt the ﬁrm, as in the case in which they involve relaxing environmental or labor regula-
tionsinbadstatesoftheworld.11 Weﬁndthattheoptimalcontractwithdistortionarysubsidies
involves a minimum operating proﬁt guarantee coupled to a maximum bound to proﬁts: the
government subsidizes the ﬁrm in the worst states (in which there is no expropriation), sets
a maximum value to operating proﬁts in the good states of the world, and has an intermedi-
ate range of states where the ﬁrm receives all the revenue generated by the project, but is not
subsidized.
In the case of moral hazard in effort, effort impacts the results of the project, by reducing
marginal costs throughout the life of the project. In a mining project, for example, as the grade
7We do not analyze the possibility of a project that does not break even in expected value, i.e., one that impov-
erishes the country.
8This may lead to procyclical government income, which should be addressed via a countercyclical spending
rule.
9Thisauctionissimilartothepresent-value-of-revenueauctionanalyzedinEngel,FischerandGaletovic(2001).
10The study of this case was suggested by our discussant in the Natural Resources and Populism Conference,
Richard Zeckhauser.
11Since the revenue collected by the government from the project can be used to reduce distortionary taxation
elsewhere in the economy, the deadweight loss associated with subsidies for the ﬁrm ﬁnanced via taxes does not
provide a rationale for the result that follows. For a formal derivation of this insight, see the Irrelevance Result in
Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2007).
4of the ore declines, marginal costs tend to increase until they become higher than operating
costs, and the mine closes down. By reducing marginal costs, the amount of minerals extracted
before the mine has to close down is higher, and this is more valuable when prices are high.
In this case the optimal contract does not set a ﬁxed cap on the operating proﬁts of the ﬁrm,
since that would lead to insufﬁcient effort. Nevertheless, as in the benchmark model, the op-
timal contract lowers the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, as compared to the standard contract in high demand
scenarios. In this case it does so by imposing a schedule similar to progressive taxation when
operating proﬁts exceed predetermined values. Thus, the government trades off the the dead-
weight cost associated to expropriation in high revenue scenarios, while providing incentives
that increase their likelihood.12
Wealsoconsiderthecaseinwhichtheﬁrmfacespoliticalmoralhazard,andcanexertcostly
effort to reduce the probability of expropriation. The optimal contract is similar to that in the
simpler case with no political moral hazard. It stipulates that in bad states the ﬁrm operates
the franchise forever, while in better states the contract lasts until a ﬁxed amount of operating
proﬁts, commontoallthesestates, iscollected. Thereasonthat, incontrasttothecaseofmoral
hazard in effort, here effort affects the probability of expropriation across states, but does not
increase the probability of higher income states. Hence there is no conﬂict between reducing
the probability of expropriation by limiting contracted proﬁts and providing incentives in order
to increase the probability of higher states.
Finally, we come to the issue of implementation. It would be politically unfeasible to have a
contractinwhichthegovernmentcollectsnothingwhileaccumulatedproﬁtsarelowerthanthe
limiting amount of proﬁts, and receives all the residual afterwards, with all the attendant com-
plications for the government of operating the mine. Consider then the following schematic
proposal to determine the windfall tax in a given period. Each period, an independent agency
makes the best estimate of future discounted proﬁts given current information. This estimate
plus the proﬁts accrued and taxes already paid leads to an estimate of the present value of taxes
that needs to be paid in the future so as to comply with the contract. The ﬁrm then pays a tax
proportional to this amount, for example, the fraction that, if paid indeﬁnitely, would lead, in
expectation, to paying the windfall tax stipulated in the contract. In the absence of uncertainty
about future proﬁts, this tax rate leads to a tax burden that remains constant over time. Given
the existence of uncertainty, it may be desirable to have a lower tax rate, set so that the proba-
bility of the ﬁrm earning less than the contracted amount is a predetermined and small value.
Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows. Inthenextsection,whichcanbeskipped
without loss of continuity, we relate this paper to the literature. Section 3 describes the basic
12Ifthemoralhazardeffectdominatestheexpropriationeffect,thestandardcontractwhichprovidesfullresidual
rights to the private ﬁrm, is again optimal.
5model and derives the main results, including how to implement the optimal contract with a
competitive auction with realistic informational assumptions. Section 4 considers various ex-
tensions. The last section concludes.
2 Relation to the literature
There is an extensive literature on optimal taxation of exhaustible natural resources to which
this paper is related (see Heaps and Helliwell (1985), Gillis (1982) and Boadway and Flatters
(1993) for classical references).13 Also related to this paper is Bohn and Deacon (2000), which
study both theoretically and empirically the effects of insecure ownership on investment and
natural resource use. They show that investment falls with insecure ownership and therefore
the net effect on depletion of natural resources is ambiguous. Finally, Fraser and Kingwell
(1997) compares the performance of resource rent taxes and ad valorem royalties on invest-
ment levels, but the effects the authors describe are due to risk aversion, whereas in our case
the investors are risk neutral.
There are two justiﬁcations to tax resource rents over and above the levies that are implicit
in general income taxes. One is the efﬁciency based argument that resource-rents are not dis-
torting (but note that this argument requires positive ex ante and not ex post rents). The other
reason is an equity based argument that suggests that natural resource rents should accrue to
the population at large, not to a few private individuals. We assume that the private ﬁrm is
paid no rent at all when solving the planner’s problem (i.e., rents receive no weight in the social
welfare function), which is consistent with the assumption that the ﬁrm is foreign. However,
the characteristics of the optimal contract remain unchanged when the planner weighs ﬁrm’s
proﬁts in the objective function, as long as this weight is not too large (see Result 3 for a formal
statement).
Ourcontributiontothisliteratureistoincorporate, inadmittedlyreducedreform, theprob-
ability of expropriation and the deadweight loss associated with this event into the planner’s
objective function. Also, in contrast to most of that literature, the taxes that are implicit in our
contract are on the present value of ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and not on ﬂow proﬁts, i.e., we assume away
the dynamic issues. This simpliﬁes our analysis considerably and explains why we can im-
plement the planner’s optimal contract via a competitive auction with realistic informational
13There also is an extensive literature, going back to Hotelling (1931), that derives the price of an exhaustible
natural resource as an equilibrium outcome resulting from optimal extraction (see, for example, Devarajan and
Fisher (1981), Salant (1995) and the references cited therein). We depart from this literature by assuming exoge-
nously given demand uncertainty, i.e. a small country assumption, as well as by omitting the dynamic issue of
optimal resource extraction. Moreover, we search for the optimal contract when expropriation is possible and
depends on the price realization.
6requirements.
As noted by Boadway and Flatters (1993), there are three ‘ideal’ approaches for government
to divert rents to the public sector. One approach is a fully ﬂedged cash ﬂow tax, which implies
thattaxliabilitieswillbenegativeatinitialstagesofexploitationofthenaturalresource, making
governments reluctant to adopt this option. A second approach is that the government takes a
share of equity in the ﬁrm. The third approach is for governments to capture rents by having
ﬁrms bid for the rights to exploit the resource. The winning ﬁrm provides an upfront payment
in exchange for the perpetual right to extract the resource. This option is not credible, precisely
due to the time inconsistency in government policy: i.e., due to ex post expropriation. The pol-
icy proposals that emerge from this paper lie within this third group, even though the bidding
variable that implements the planner’s optimal contract is the ﬁrm’s present discounted proﬁt.
Thishastheadvantagethatnoupfrontpaymentsbytheﬁrmtothegovernmentareneeded,but
motivates extending our model to incorporate moral hazard, since the ﬁrm’s incentives to ex-
tract the resource efﬁciently are reduced by the fact that under our contract it is not the residual
claimant of revenues generated by the contract.14
Theplanner’sproblemconsideredinthispaperhasmuchincommonwiththeproblemfac-
ing the planner who designs the optimal public-private partnership contract in Engel, Fischer
and Galetovic (2007), and therefore the results we obtain share the ﬂavor of the results obtained
in that paper as well. Interestingly, we do not need to assume a risk averse ﬁrm here, since the
possibility of expropriation combined with a deadweight loss associated with expropriations
leads the planner to view a risk neutral ﬁrm’s behavior as if it were risk averse, at least for high
demand realizations.
3 The main model
A natural resource project (‘mining project’ in what follows) requires a ﬁxed amount of upfront
investment I common across ﬁrms. The present value of operational proﬁts generated by the
project are described by a probability density f (v), with support [vmin,vmax] and c.d.f. F(v).
Operationalproﬁtsareequaltorevenueminusoperatingcostsminusstandardincometaxes,in
whatfollowswereferindistinctlytorevenuesandoperationalproﬁts. Thedensity f summarizes
exogenouspriceuncertainty,i.e.,theprojectsellsitsproductinalargeworldmarketoverwhich
it has no inﬂuence.15
14Osmundsen (1998) considers the case of optimal dynamic taxation with adverse selection in the ﬁrm’s cost
structure. By contrast, we assume identical ﬁrms.
15The case where f responds to actions taken by the ﬁrm is considered when studying moral hazard in Section
4.
7A contract is characterized by a schedule Rc(v) that deﬁnes the ﬁrm’s present discounted
remuneration as a function of discounted revenues generated by the project, v; the subscript c
emphasizes that this is the remuneration stipulated in the contract, thereby ignoring the pos-
sibility that the contract will be cut short by expropriation and realized revenues may be lower.
The only source of remuneration for the ﬁrm are revenues generated by the project, therefore
0≤Rc(v)≤ v. The government is the residual claimant of revenues generated by the project, so
that, according to the contract, in state v it receives v −Rc(v).16
At the time of contracting, expropriations are random events, both as to when they happen
and as to the amount expropriated. Because of this, in state v, the ﬁrm may end up receiving
present discounted proﬁts that can lie anywhere between −I (when the government expropri-
ates all its revenue) and Rc(v)−I (when no expropriation takes place). Since the government
and the ﬁrm are risk neutral, all we need to know about expropriations is expected proﬁts that
accrue to the ﬁrm in state v after expropriation. We denote this function by Πe(Rc(v)−I), and
refer to it as the effective proﬁt function. In general, Πe(x) denotes the present value of the
ﬁrm’s expected ex-post discounted proﬁts, when the contract entitles it to proﬁts equal to x.
This function summarizes, admittedly in reduced form, all the (common) knowledge available
to the planner and the ﬁrm about future expropriation scenarios when signing the resource
extraction contract. Will the next president be market friendly or a die hard nationalist? And
if she turns out to be a die hard nationalist, will the ﬁrm be successful bribing the upcoming
administration to avoid expropriation?
In this section Πe is determined exogenously, that is, the current planner and ﬁrm’s actions
have no effect on this function.17 We make the following assumptions regarding this function:
Assumption 1 (Effective proﬁt functions) Theeffectiveproﬁtfunction, Πe(x), hasacontinuous
second derivative, and there exists an xE ≥ 0, referred to as the expropriation threshold, that
satisﬁes:
1. Πe(x)= x for x ≤ xE.
2. Π0
e(x)>0 and Π00
e(x)<0, for all x > xE.
The ﬁrst property says that there exists a threshold for effective proﬁts below which expropria-
tion cannot take place: expropriations are possible only when discounted proﬁts are positive,
larger than xE.18 The second property implies that, beyond this threshold, the ﬁrm’s effective
16In Section 3.3 we discuss alternative options for how the government actually collects its share.
17We relax this assumption in Section 4.
18Many of the results we derive are simpler if we assume Πe(x) strictly concave for all x, that is, when expropria-
tions are possible for all realizations of v. In this case the planner’s problem is analogous to the one considered in
Engel et al. (2007).
8proﬁt increases with the discounted proﬁts it is entitled to according to the contract, albeit at a
decreasing rate.
Theabovepropertiesassumethatexpropriationdependsontheproﬁtrate,thatis,on(Rc(v)−
I)/I, which is linear in Rc(v). The quote at the beginning of this paper, from Salvador Allende’s
1972 speech at United Nations, is consistent with this assumption. If the ﬁrm earns 5 times its
investment, so that its proﬁt rate is 400%, it expects to loose a much larger fraction of its proﬁt
because of expropriation than if its proﬁt rate is only 20%. This is captured by the ﬁrst assump-
tion. Furthermore, if the ﬁrm expects to loose one half of every additional dollar generated by
the project when the proﬁt rate increases from 200 to 210% due to expropriation, then the sec-
ond assumption implies that it will grab more than half of every additional dollar of proﬁt when
the proﬁt rate goes from 210 to 220%.
Our ﬁnal assumption relates to the cost of expropriations. We assume that when a min-
ing project is expropriated, the ﬁrm challenges the decision in (possibly international) court,
thereby imposing a cost on the government of defending itself. This deadweight loss is a frac-
tion µ of the expropriated value of the project, where 0<µ<1.19
3.1 Planner’s problem
In the benchmark model there is no moral hazard, and therefore no need to provide incentives
for performance. In order for ﬁrms to be willing participants in the project, the contract offered
by the planner must satisfy the ﬁrm’s participation constraint:
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥0.
Since the government is the residual claimant of revenues generated by the mining project, in
state v its expected revenue is the difference between net (of investment) revenues generated
by the project, v −I, and proﬁts accrued to the ﬁrm, Πe(Rc(v)−I):
Expected government revenue = v −I −Πe(Rc(v)−I),
while the average loss to the ﬁrm due to expropriation is the difference between proﬁts it was
entitled to in the contract and actual proﬁts:
Revenue loss for the ﬁrm due to expropriation = Rc(v)−I −Πe(Rc(v)−I).
19Alternatively, the value of the revenue stream is reduced because the new management is less efﬁcient, or
because experienced personnel leaves. Finally, there could be a cost due to an increase in the perceived riskiness
in the country for foreign investment.
9Because of the deadweight loss mentioned above, only a fraction (1−µ) of the revenue lost by
the ﬁrm due to expropriation is received by the government, hence the planner maximizes
Z
[v −I −Πe(Rc(v)−I)−µ{Rc(v)−I −Πe(Rc(v)−I)}]f (v)dv.
And as the term
R
(v −I)f (v)dv is independent of the actions of the government, the planner’s
problem is equivalent to solving:
min
Rc(v)
(1−µ)
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv +µ
Z
Rc(v)f (v)dv, (1a)
s.t.
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥0, (1b)
0≤Rc(v)≤ v. (1c)
As mentioned above, the effective proﬁt function, Πe, is exogenous, while the ﬁrm’s contractual
revenue function, Rc, is the planner’s decision variable.
It follows from (1a) that the government’s objective is to minimize a weighted average of
the operating proﬁts effectively received by the ﬁrm and those proﬁts it had contracted to pay
according to the original contract. The former enters for obvious reasons, since less money for
the ﬁrm means more money for the government. The latter is more interesting, and reﬂects the
fact that, other things equal, a contract that promises higher returns to the ﬁrm leads to larger
losses when the ﬁrm is expropriated and therefore larger losses for the government as well.
Notethatthereisanotherinterpretation, mentionedintheintroduction: thehigherthecost
the ﬁrm can impose on the government by challenging the expropriation decision (via a higher
µ), the more weight the government gives to the terms of the original contract in the objective
function, i.e., to Rc(v). In other words, the more secure the property rights of the foreign ﬁrm,
the more the government concentrates on reducing the contractual proﬁts, while if property
rights are insecure (small µ), the government is willing to offer more generous terms in the
original contract, since it knows that the costs of expropriation are lower.
3.2 Optimal Contract
We ﬁrst consider projects that can be ﬁnanced with operating proﬁts below the expropriation
threshold (so that, if desired, they could be ﬁnanced avoiding any risk of expropriation) and
show that the optimal contract indeed considers no expropriation. When the ﬁrm’s participa-
tion constraint can be satisﬁed without incurring in expropriation risk, any contract that avoids
expropriationaltogetherandforwhichtheﬁrm’sparticipationconstraintissatisﬁedwithequal-
ity is optimal (these are the high demand projects we referred to in the introduction). Expropri-
10ation should be avoided when it can be avoided.
Result 1 (Projects where expropriation can be avoided) DenotebyxE theexpropriationthresh-
old deﬁned in Assumption 1 above and assume that
Z xE
0
v f (v)dv +xE(1−F(xE))≥ I. (2)
Then any contract that satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s participation constraint with equality and for which
Rc(v)≤ I +xE for all v, is optimal. In particular, the contract with Rc(v)≡ I is optimal.
Proof The following string of equalities and inequalities shows that the planner’s objective
function is bounded from below by µI for any schedule Rc(v) that satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s participa-
tion constraint:
Z
Rc(v)f (v)dv = I +
Z
[Rc(v)−I]f (v)dv
= I +
Z
Π−1
e (Πe(Rc(v)−I))f (v)dv
≥ I +Π−1
e
µZ
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv
¶
≥ I +Π−1
e (0)
= I.
The ﬁrst and second equalities are trivial. The ﬁrst inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality
(Assumption 1 implies that Π−1
e is convex) while the second inequality is justiﬁed by the ﬁrm’s
participation constraint. Finally, the last equality follows from the assumption that Πe(0) = 0
(which follows from Assumption 1).
Next note that any schedule with Rc(v) ≤ I +xE that satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s participation con-
straint with equality attains a value of µI for the planner’s objective function (1a) and therefore
is optimal.
Finally note that the ﬁrst inequality is strict unless the function Πe(x) is linear in the range
of values taken by Rc(v) ≤ I +xE. Thus the set of optimal policies derived above is the set of all
optimal policies.
The intuition for this result is the following: When the planner can design a contract that
avoids expropriations and satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s participation constraint with equality, this con-
tract is optimal, since it avoids the deadweight loss associated with expropriations altogether.
11Even though the ﬁrm is indifferent between this and a wide variety of contracts where its ex-
pected proﬁts, net of expropriation risk, are zero, the planner prefers the contract without ex-
propriations.
The next result analyzes the case in which the expropriation risk is unavoidable (intermedi-
ate demand projects according to the introduction). It conﬁrms the intuition that the planner
wants this risk to be as small as possible.
Result 2 (Projects with unavoidable expropriation) Assume that there exists no contract that
avoids expropriation risk altogether, that is:
Z xE
0
v f (v)dv +xE(1−F(xE))< I. (3)
Also assume that the ﬁrm’s participation constraint can be satisﬁed:
Z ∞
0
Πe(v −I)f (v)dv >0.
Then M deﬁned via Z
Πe(min(M,v)−I)f (v)dv =0, (4)
is ﬁnite and larger than xE. More important, Rc(v) = min(v,M) characterizes the optimal con-
tract (see Figure 1). That is, operational proﬁts of the ﬁrm in the optimal contract are limited to a
cap M deﬁned in (4).
v
Rc(v)−I
xE −I
Πe(v −I)
Πe(M −I)
0
xE M
−I
I
M −I
Rc(v)−I
Figure 1: The optimal contract in the case where expropriation is unavoidable
12Proof Even though a proof based on the problem’s Lagrangian and complementary slackness
conditions is straightforward, we believe the following informal argument provides more in-
sight.
It is obvious that the ﬁrm’s participation constraint will hold with equality in the optimal
contract. Also, increasing by one dollar the ﬁrm’s revenues stipulated in the contract in state
v increases the ﬁrm’s expected revenue by Π0
e(Rc(v)− I)f (v) while it increases the objective
function the planner wishes to minimize by [(1−µ)Π0
e(Rc(v)−I)+µ]f (v). It follows that the rate
at which the objective function increases with the money being collected by the ﬁrm is
ρ(v,Rc(v))≡(1−µ)+
µ
Π0
e(Rc(v)−I)
. (5)
The smallest value ρ(v,Rc(v)) can take is one, and it takes this value if and only if Rc(v) ≤ xE
(and Rc(v) is feasible, that is, 0 ≤ Rc(v) ≤ v). The planner ﬁrst uses up socially cheaper dollars
to satisfy the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, that is, dollars with ρ(v,Rc(v)) = 1. If the ﬁrm’s
participation constraint can be satisﬁed this way, the optimal contract belongs to the family
described in the previous proposition.
In the case we are considering here however, the planner falls short of satisfying the ﬁrm’s
participation constraint after exhausting all transfers from schedules with ρ(v,Rc(v)) = 1, and
must resort to socially more expensive revenues with ρ(v,Rc(v)) > 1. Since Assumption 1 im-
plies that ρ(v,Rc(v)) is increasing in Rc(v) for given v, it follows that in the optimal contract
ρ(v,Rc(v))=

  
  
ρ0, if ρ(v,v)≥ρ0,
(1−µ)+
µ
Π0
e(v−I), if ρ(v,v)<ρ0,
where ρ0 is chosen to satisfy the ﬁrm’s participation constraint with equality. The optimal con-
tract now follows immediately, with M deﬁned via: ρ0 =(1−µ)+µ/Π0
e(M −I).
The optimal contract, depicted in Figure 1, caps the ﬁrm’s upside risk. In doing so, the plan-
ner minimizes the deadweight loss associated with expropriation. The social cost of transfer-
ring an additional dollar to the ﬁrm increases with the amount already transferred, hence the
planner has incentives to keep the ﬁrm’s proﬁts as low as possible. The planner keeps away
from high values of Rc(v) because they entail higher expropriation probabilities, and therefore
larger gaps between expected (under the contract) and realized proﬁts for the ﬁrm. Large “dis-
appointments” by the ﬁrm are costly, since they imply larger losses for the planner.
13Two extensions follow immediately for both results above. First, if the planner gives weight
α to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, the optimal contract remains unchanged, as long as α ≤ 1−µ, for in this
case the planner minimizes
(1−µ−α)
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv +µ
Z
Rc(v)f (v)dv
and the above proofs go through without change as long as 1−µ−α≥0.
Second, if the ﬁrm’s participation constraint requires a predetermined level of rents, so that
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥Π0 >0,
the proofs of both results above continue holding with only minor modiﬁcations.
Result 3 (Optimal contract for the main model) Theplannergivesweightα≤1−µtotheﬁrm’s
proﬁt, the ﬁrm’s participation constraint is
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥Π0,
with Π0 ≥0, and the ﬁrm’s participation constraint can be satisﬁed:
Z
Πe(v −I)f (v)dv ≥Π0.
Deﬁne M via: Z
Πe(min(M,v)−I)f (v)dv =Π0.
Then the contract Rc(v) = min(M,v) solves the planner’s problem and this is the only optimal
contract if M ≥ xE. By contrast, if M < xE, any contract with Rc(v) = min(M,v) in states with
v ≥ xE that collects
R xE
0 Πe(min(M,v)−I)f (v)dv in states with v ≤ xE is optimal.
3.3 Implementation
Wehaveshownthatathresholdcontractthatspeciﬁesaparticularcapondiscountedproﬁtsfor
the ﬁrm is the optimal contract when expropriation is possible. We show next how this contract
can be implemented via a competitive auction. Following this result, we discuss some practical
implementation issues that are ignored by our framework.
Result 4 (Implementation) There exist many identical ﬁrms for which
Z
Πe(v −I)f (v)dv ≥Π0, (6)
14with Π0, Πe(x), f (v) and Π0 deﬁned earlier.
The following auction then implements the optimal contract: Firms bid on the present value
of revenue they are entitled to by the contract, the ﬁrm that bids the lowest value, β, wins. The
contract stipulates that the winning ﬁrm collects β if v > β and v otherwise.20 The ﬁrm bears
demand (i.e. price) and expropriation risk under the ensuing contract.
The planner does not need to know the ex ante probability density f (v), the expropriation
probabilities (and therefore the effective proﬁt function Πe(x)), the upfront investment I or the
outside option Π0 to implement the optimal contract via a competitive auction. The planner
needs to observe operating proﬁts, since it needs this information to enforce the contract (in high
demand scenarios it must determine when the ﬁrm has collected M). Finally, no ﬁrm will bid in
the auction if the project is not privately proﬁtable, that is, if (6) does not hold.
Proof Given a winning bid β, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in state v is β−I if v ≥ β and v −I otherwise.
Thus the winning ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts are:
Z
Πe(min(β,v)−I)f (v)dv.
This expression is continuous, negative for low values of β, positive for large values of β (be-
cause of (6)), and strictly increasing in β. Hence there exists a unique ¯ β for which
Z
Πe(min( ¯ β,v)−I)f (v)dv =Π0.
This bid wins the auction (in the sense that it deﬁnes the Nash equilibrium) and it is trivial to
see that ¯ β is equal to the threshold M that characterizes the optimal contract in Results 3 (note
that M = I in the case of a project with avoidable expropriation, as in Result 1).
Working with discounted revenues has provided tractability, at the expense of avoiding dy-
namic issues. There are many revenue trajectories for the ﬁrm and government that will imple-
ment the optimal contract, in that they satisfy the condition that their present values are those
stipulatedinthecontract. Thismotivatesdiscussing,atleastinformally,whichofthismultitude
of trajectories are more attractive in practice.
One possibility is to allow the ﬁrm to collect all revenues from the project until their dis-
countedvalueaddsuptoM oritisexpropriated. Thereareseveralproblemswiththisapproach.
First, the government collects windfall taxes only late in the contract. Contracts with long ges-
20Theresultingauctionisanalogoustothepresent-value-of-revenue(PVR)auctionstudiedinEngel,Fischerand
Galetovic (2001).
15tation periods before the government collects any windfall tax, even in high demand scenar-
ios, are likely to lead to a higher expropriation risk, thus lowering the effective proﬁt function,
Πe(v), and therefore are unattractive. Second, the government has to operate the project once
the threshold of ﬁrm’s proﬁts is attained, which is not appealing.
An alternative implementation, which we believe to be more attractive, is to deﬁne by con-
tract a windfall tax schedule that increases with the ﬁrm’s accumulated discounted proﬁts at
the date of taxation and decreases with the amount of windfall taxes paid. We present a simple
example of such a schedule.
Example 1 Production is constant over time (and equal to one), production costs are zero, and
the price of the natural resource follows a random walk:21
Pt =Pt−1+²t,
where the ²t are i.i.d. with zero mean and variance σ2. The discount rate is constant over time
and denoted by r.
Unless indicated otherwise, all discounted values are expressed as of time zero. Denoting ex-
pected discounted revenues between period s and u by Ru
s , and by EtRu
s the corresponding ex-
pected value conditional on information available in period t (given the random walk assump-
tion, this is equivalent to conditioning on Pt), we have:
EtR∞
t =(1+r)−t X
k≥0
(1+r)−kEtPt+k =(1+r)−t X
k≥0
(1+r)−kPt =
1
r(1+r)t−1Pt.
Hence:
EtR∞
0 =Rt
0+
1
r(1+r)t−1Pt.
Denote by T u
s discounted windfall taxes paid by the ﬁrm between periods s and u and by M the
revenue threshold that characterizes the optimal contract. If σ = 0, that is, if there is no price
uncertainty, we have that the windfall tax schedule in period t dollars deﬁned by:
Tt =
r
1+r
[EtR∞
0 −T t−1
0 −M]
implements the optimal contract with a constant tax payment in all periods.
In general, when σ>0 and we have uncertainty, deﬁning
Tt =
δr
1+r
[EtR∞
0 −T t−1
0 −M],
21Whatfollowscanbeextendedeasilytothecasewherethepriceofthenaturalresource(oritslog)followamore
general process, e.g., a ﬁrst-order autorgressive process.
16with δ ∈ (0,1], provides a family of plausible windfall tax schedule. The parameter δ should de-
creaseasσincreases,toensurethattheprobabilitythattheﬁrm’sdiscountedpaymentofwindfall
taxes exceeds v −M is small.
The auction that implements the optimal contract differs in important ways from the stan-
dard auction considered in the literature to dissipate rents of natural resource projects. While
the standard auction involves an up-front payment to the government by the ﬁrm, the auction
derived in this paper does not. In the case of this auction, the ﬁrm’s bid is linked to the degree
of progressivity of the windfall tax faced by the ﬁrm. More aggressive bids are associated with
higher expected proﬁts and lead to more progressive taxation.
3.4 Welfare Gain
As noted in Section 2, the standard auction proposed in the literature to dissipate rents of an
exhaustiblenaturalresourceproject,hasﬁrmsbidfortheperpetualrighttoextracttheresource.
Next we compare the welfare implications of this auction (‘standard auction’ in what follows)
with those of the optimal auction under threat of expropriation derived above.
Since both auctions dissipate the ﬁrm’s rents (we assume that the ﬁrm’s outside option, Π0,
does not depend on the auction), in both cases the project’s rents accrue exclusively to the
government. Itfollowsthattheauctionthatismostattractiveforthegovernmentistheonethat
leads to the smallest average deadweight loss from expropriation. With the standard auction,
the deadweight loss is given by
L st =µ
Z
[v −I −Πe(v −I)]f (v)dv,
while for the optimal auction derived in this section the loss is:
Lopt =µ
Z
[Rc(v)−I −Πe(Rc(v)−I)]f (v)dv.
Since Rc(v)=min(M,v) for the optimal contract,22 we have:
Lopt =µ
Z M
0
[v −I −Πe(v −I)]f (v)dv +µ
Z ∞
M
[M −I −Πe(M −I)]f (v)dv.
22The unique optimal contract takes this form when expropriation cannot be avoided (see Result 2) and one of
many optimal contracts takes this form when expropriation can be avoided (see Result 1).
17Subtracting Lopt from Lst leads to the following expression for the government’s gain from
using the optimal auction:
Gain = µ
Z ∞
M
[v −I −Πe(v −I)−{M −I −Πe(M −I)}]f (v)dv. (7)
Note that the Gain is positive only for states where prices are sufﬁciently high that revenues
arelargerthanM. Theoptimalcontractprovidesnogaininrelativelylowdemandstates. Deﬁne
the “grab function” G(x) ≡ x −Πe(x).23 We have that G(x) = 0 for x ≤ xE, while G(x) is strictly
increasing for x > xE, withG0(x)=1−Π0
e(x)>0 in this range. It then follows that
Gain=µ
Z ∞
M
[G(v −I)−G(M −I)]f (v)dv
and since the integrand is strictly positive, the gain from using the optimal contract is strictly
positive as well.
The intuition for why the contract derived above is better than the standard contract is the
following: The optimal contract avoids, to the extent allowed by the ﬁrm’s participation con-
straint, scenarios where expropriations are more costly, in terms of deadweight loss, thereby
leading to higher welfare than the standard auction. Welfare gains are larger when the thresh-
old M is lower, that is, for example, when the ﬁrm’s outside option Π0 is lower.
Even in the case where the distribution of revenue from the project is highly skewed, wel-
fare gains from the optimal auction can be signiﬁcant. Consider, for example, an exploratory
prospect where the probability of success is π and I corresponds to investment in exploration.
Conditional on successful exploration, the distribution of revenue is described by a probability
density f (w) (with c.d.f. F(w)) that takes values between wm and wM. The revenue threshold
that characterizes the optimal contract, M, then solves:
Z M
wm
Πe(w −I)f (w)dw +Πe(M −I)(1−F(M))=
(1−π)
π
I. (8)
Revenue uncertainty is usually large in such a project, even conditional on successful explo-
ration, which amounts to a a large variance of f (w). It then follows that the threshold M will be
much smaller than wM if the project is highly proﬁtable ex-ante; and welfare gains associated
with moving from the standard to the optimal contract can be expected to be considerable. For
example, if π = 0.1, the r.h.s. of (8) suggests that return on investment will average 900% when
exploration is successful, yet realized proﬁt rates may still vary substantially, say between 500
and 2000%, as is likely to be the case for most natural resource projects. Gains from the optimal
23The “grab function” terminology was suggested by Richard Zeckhauser.
18contract are negligible only for a project where the ﬁrm’s participation constraint holds for a
value of M close to wM.
The following result summarizes our result on the welfare gain from the optimal contract:
Result 5 Welfareundertheoptimalauctionderivedinthissectionishigherthanunderthestan-
dard auction where ﬁrms bid on the right to extract the resource indeﬁnitely. The welfare gain
from the optimal auction is equal to:
Gain = µ
Z ∞
M
[v −I −Πe(v −I)−{M −I −Πe(M −I)}]f (v)dv >0.
4 Extensions
In this section we examine two extensions of practical importance. First, we study the case in
whichthegovernmentprovidessubsidiestotheﬁrminbadstatesoftheworld. Inthecontextof
thispaper, subsidiesusuallytranslateinlaxerapplicationofenvironmentalorlaborregulations
and sometimes into direct cash transfers. The second extension incorporates moral hazard, for
example, it could be that by exerting costly effort, the foreign investor can reduce unobservable
costs and increase revenues. The question is how to design a contract that provides optimal
incentives.
4.1 Subsidies
Themainproblemofsubsidiesisthattheycostgovernmentsmorethanthebeneﬁttheyprovide
to ﬁrms. If labor and environmental regulations are meant to correct externalities, the social
cost of the laxer regulations is higher than the private beneﬁt perceived by the foreign investor.
Hence we assume that a subsidy S(v) has a social cost of ζS(v), ζ > 1, so that the objective
function maximized by the planner now is:
Z
[v−I−Πe(Rc(v)+S(v)−I)−(ζ−1)S(v)−µ{Rc(v)+S(v)−I −Πe(Rc(v)+S(v)−I)}]f (v)dv, (9)
where the term (ζ−1)S(v) captures the social cost of the subsidy, beyond its private value. Two
schedules are available to the planner now to achieve her objective, the revenue schedule Rc(v)
and the subsidy schedule S(v).24
24We assume no transfers from general funds are possible, these could be incorporated following the approach
used in Engel et al. (2007) without affecting the qualitative nature of the results we obtain.
19The problem facing the planner is equivalent to:
min
Rc(v),S(v)
(1−µ)
Z
Πe(Rc(v)+S(v)−I)f (v)dv +µ
Z
Rc(v)f (v)dv +(µ+ζ−1)
Z
S(v)f (v)dv,
(10a)
s.t.
Z
Πe(Rc(v)+S(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥0, (10b)
0≤Rc(v)≤ v, (10c)
S(v)≥0. (10d)
In order to solve this problem, note that as in the proof of result 2, the participation con-
straint (10b) holds with equality. Hence the problem is similar to that in section 3 of Engel et al.
(2007), with the expropriation function Πe playing the role of the ﬁrm’s concave utility function
u.25 The only difference is that Πe(x) is linear in net proﬁts for x ≤ xE while the utility function
considered in Engel et al. (2007) is strictly concave everywhere.
Hence, the results of that paper apply to this case, with slight modiﬁcations. For example,
Rc(v)< v and S(v)>0 cannot be optimal, since achieving the ﬁrm’s participation constraint via
subsidies has a higher cost for the government than achieving it via the income generated by
the project. Also, demand states can be classiﬁed into high, intermediate and low-demand. In
high demand states the optimal contract stipulates Rc(v) < v and S(v) = 0. Expropriations is
most likely in these states, the optimal contract assigns the same value of Rc(v) to all states in
this group (denote it by ˜ M) and the government collects a windfall tax equal to v− ˜ M. Similarly,
Rc(v)= v and S(v)>0 in low demand states. In these states there are no expropriations and no
windfall taxes. Finally, there exist a range of intermediate demand states, where Rc(v) = v and
S(v)=0. There are no windfall taxes in these states, yet expropriations can happen but are less
likely than in high demand states.
Result 6 (Optimal contract with subsidies) Consider the planner’s problem described by (10a)–
(10d). If there exists a ﬁnite M that satisﬁes:
Z
Πe(min(M,v)−I)f (v)dv =0, (11)
and Π0
e(M −I)≥µ/(µ+ζ−1), then the optimal contract is either the one described in Result 1 (if
Π0
e(M −I)=1) or the one described in Result 2 (if µ/(µ+ζ−1)<Π0
e(M −I)<1).
Otherwise,thatiseitherif(11)hasnosolutionor M solvingthisequationsatisﬁesΠ0
e(M−I)<
25Thefactthathere
R
Πe(Rc(v)+S(v)−I)f (v)dv showsupintheobjectivefunction,whiletheutilityfunctiondoes
not show up in the objective function in Engel et al. (2007) is irrelevant, since the ﬁrm’s participation constraint
implies that this term is equal to zero.
20µ/(µ+ζ−1), the optimal contract is characterized as follows:
Deﬁne ˜ M viaΠ0
e( ˜ M−I)=µ/(µ+ζ−1). ClearlyM > ˜ M > xE. Theoptimalcontractthensatisﬁes
Rc(v)=min( ˜ M,v)(Figure2showstheresultingcontract). Furthermore, subsidiesarehandedout
only in states where v < xE and
Z xE
0
S(v)f (v)dv =−
Z
Πe(min( ˜ M,v)−I)f (v)dv. (12)
v
Rc(v)−I
xE −I
Πe(v −I)
Πe( ˜ M −I)
0
xE ˜ M
−I
I
˜ M −I
Rc(v)−I
m−I
M
Figure 2: The optimal contract in the case of subsidies
Proof As mentioned above, S(v) > 0 and Rc(v) < v cannot be optimal. Hence states can be
classiﬁed into three categories: (a) Rc(v) < v and S(v) = 0, (b) Rc(v) = v and S(v) = 0, and (c)
Rc(v)= v and S(v)>0.
Next we extend the argument used to prove Result 2. The planner’s cost of providing an
additional dollar of revenues to satisfy the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, is
ρR(v,Rc(v))=(1−µ)+
µ
Π0
e(Rc(v)−I)
,
where we have used that S(v) = 0 since additional revenue from the project can be provided to
the ﬁrm only if Rc(v)< v.
21Similarly, the planner’s per-dollar cost of providing an additional dollar via subsidies is:
ρS(v,Rc(v))=(1−µ)+
µ+ζ−1
Π0
e(v +S(v)−I)
,
where this time we used that Rc(v) = v when S(v) > 0. In particular, this cost is lowest (and
equal to ζ) when v ≤ xE.
In the optimal contract the planner resorts to more expensive options to satisfy the ﬁrm’s
participation constraint only once cheaper options are exhausted. Since the social cost of ﬁ-
nancing the ﬁrm with subsidies is ζ, and there is no limit to the resources available to ﬁnance
the ﬁrm with this option, the planner will use revenues as long as their social cost is smaller
than ζ and will then resort to subsidies to complete the amount needed to satisfy the ﬁrm’s
participation constraint.
ItfollowsthattheplannersetsRc(v)=min( ˜ M,v)sincethisassignstotheﬁrmalltherevenue
with marginal cost less than or equal to ζ. From the assumptions we know that the income
obtained in this way is not enough to satisfy the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, since it adds up
to
R
Πe(min( ˜ M,v)−I)f (v)dv <0. Thustheﬁrmobtainstheremainingincomeneededtosatisfy
its participation constraint via subsidies in states where expropriations are impossible.
Implementation
A simple two-threshold auction, analogous to the one derived in Engel et al. (2007), imple-
ments the optimal contract in this case.
Result 7 (Implementation with subsidies) Thefollowingtwo-threshold,scoringauctionimple-
ments the solution to the planner’s problem (10a)–(10d)
• The government announces the probability density of expected discounted proﬁt ﬂow from
the project, f (v), and the parameter ζ that summarizes the social cost of subsidies.
• Firms bid on the minimum revenue guarantee, m, and the cap on their user fee revenue,
M, so that, in case of winning: Rc(v)=min(M,v) and S(v)=max(m−v,0).
• The ﬁrm that bids the lowest value of the scoring function
W(m,M)=µM(1−F(M)) + µ
Z M
m
v f (v)dv + (µ+ζ−1)mF(m) − (ζ−1)
Z m
0
v f (v)dv
wins the contract.26
26Note that M here corresponds to ˜ M in Result 6.
22Proof
We ﬁrst note that the optimal contract can be implemented via a contract characterized by
the threshold pair (M,m), where M denotes the revenue cap, and m the minimum revenue
guarantee. In the ﬁrst scenario described in Result 6, M is deﬁned via (11) and m can be any
number less than or equal to vmin (recall that the support of f (v) is [vmin,vmax]). In the second
scenario in Result 6, M is deﬁned via
Π0
e(M −I)=
µ
µ+ζ−1
and m via: Z m
0
(m−v)f (v)dv =−
Z
Πe(min(M,v)−I)f (v)dv. (13)
It is easy to see that in a Nash equilibrium the winning bid minimizes the scoring function,
subject to the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, among all contracts in the two-threshold family
described above. Since, the scoring function differs from the planners objective function only
in a term proportional to the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts, and this term is equal to zero for the opti-
mal contract, the optimal contract also solves the planner’s problem constrained to the family
of two-threshold contracts described above. The proof concludes by noting that this family
includes the optimal contract.
What is the intuition underlying this result? Note ﬁrst that the planner’s problem is equiv-
alent to minimizing an objective function that does not require knowledge of I or Πe. The ob-
jective function only depends on the probability distribution of the present value of revenue
that the project can generate and the distortions associated with government expenditures, as
summarized by ζ. By awarding the contract to the bidder that maximizes his objective func-
tion, and assuming competitive bidding, the planner induces ﬁrms to solve society’s problem
without knowing the cost of the project or the expropriation risk.
As before, in the case of a high demand project, that is a project where the ﬁrm’s participa-
tion constraint can be satisﬁed without expropriation risk, the two-threshold auction is equiv-
alent to a PVR auction. In this case any bid with M = I and m ≤ I wins the auction, and no
subsidies are paid out.
4.2 Moral hazard in effort
The possibility of expropriations may lead ﬁrms to spend less on upfront investments that re-
duce costs during the exploitation of the natural resource. The framework developed in this pa-
23per is not needed to make this point, as it can be made with the simpler, static model discussed
in the Appendix. Yet it is instructive to derive this result within the framework developed in this
paper, and explore the extent to which the results of previous sections continue holding. That
is what we do in this section. We show that, loosely speaking, the optimal contract combines
the two effects: it provides incentives for effort (investment), while lowering the probability of
costly expropriation, i.e., it resembles a progressive tax above a predetermined operating proﬁt
threshold.
4.2.1 The planner’s problem
We embed the benchmark model of section 3 in a simple moral hazard framework. The ﬁrm’s
marginal extraction costs are decreasing in the ﬁrm’s effort, ², exerted at the time the upfront
investment I is made. This can be summarized by assuming that the probability density de-
scribing the ﬁrm’s discounted proﬁts is determined by ² ≥ 0, so that we may write f (v|²). The
impact of effort is larger when price turns out to be higher, since optimal production can be
expected to be higher in this case. Thus the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds,
so that `(v,²) ≡
∂f
∂²(v|²)/f (v|²) is increasing in v for all ²; i.e., effort increases the probability of
higherrealizationsofdemand. Effort²coststheﬁrmk²,k >0,sothatitsexpectedproﬁtinstate
v,netofexpropriation,isΠe(Rc(v)−I)−k². Sinceitisnecessarytoensurethattheﬁrmprovides
effort, we need to introduce an incentive compatibility constraint in the planner’s program.
The planner chooses effort ², and a revenue schedule Rc(v) to solve the following program
min
{Rc(v),²}
Z £
µ(Rc(v)−I)+(1−µ){Πe(Rc(v)−I)−(v −I)}
¤
f (v|²)dv (14a)
s.t.
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v|²)dv ≥k², (14b)
²=argmax
²0
½Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v|²0)dv −k²0
¾
, (14c)
0≤Rc(v)≤ v. (14d)
Comparing program (1a)–(1c) with program (14a)–(14d) it can be seen that the term v −I can
no longer be dropped because effort affects the p.d.f. of revenue (or operating proﬁt). Con-
straint (14b) is the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, and (14c) is the incentive compatibility con-
straint.
Under standard assumptions,27 we can use the First Order Approach to examine the prop-
erties of the solution. The concessionaire’s incentive compatibility constraint then can be re-
27E.g., strict concavity of the agent’s utility as a function of ² and the convexity of the distribution function con-
dition, see, e.g., Proposition 5.2 in Laffont and Martimort [2002].
24placed by Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)`(v,²)f (v|²)dv =k. (15)
Denoting by γ>0 the multiplier associated with (14b), which will hold with equality, and by
τ>0 the multiplier associated with (15), we have that the Lagrangian of the problem is:
L =
Z £
µ(Rc(v)−I)+(1−µ){Πe(Rc(v)−I)−(v −I)}
¤
f (v|²)dv
−γ
·Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v|²)dv −k²
¸
−τ
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)`(v,²)f (v|²)dv. (16)
The ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. to ², combined with (15), provides an expression for τ where the
multiplier for the participation constraint does not appear:
τ=
R £
µ(Rc(v)−I)+(1−µ)Πe(Rc(v)−I)−(v −I)
¤
`(v,²)f (v|²)dv
R
Πe(Rc(v)−I)
∂2f
∂²2 (v,²)dv
.
If 0<Rc(v)< v the ﬁrst order condition for Rc(v) derived from the Lagrangian yields:
Π0
e(Rc(v)−I)=
µ
(µ+γ−1)+τ`(v,²)
. (17)
TheMLRPthenimpliesthatRc(v)isstrictlyincreasinginv. Furthermore,thesolutionisinterior
if and only if the denominator in the right hand side expression is positive (which ensures that
v >0) and
Π0
e(v −I)<
µ
(µ+γ−1)+τ`(v,²)
,
which ensures that Rc(v)< v.
Standard arguments used for moral hazard models (as in the proof of Proposition 5.2 in Laf-
fontandMartimort[2002])canbeusedtoshowthatµ+γ−1>0andτ>0. This, combinedwith
theMLRP ,impliesthatforsufﬁcientlylarge v thedenominatorintherighthandsideexpression
of(17)ispositive. ItthenfollowsthatifΠ0
e(v−I)tendstozerofasterthan`(v,²)tendstoinﬁnity,
in the sense that for all positive constants a and b
lim
v→∞Π0
e(v −I)[a+b`(v,²)]=0, (18)
then there exists a threshold M s.t. Rc(v)< v for all v ≥ M.
For example, if Πe(x) = 1−exp(−cx), for x > 0, with c > 0, and f (v|²) is exponential with
mean θ(²) and θ0(²)>0, then
lim
v→∞Π0
e(v −I)[a+b`(v,²)]= lim
v→∞ce−c(v−I)[a0+b0v]=0,
25where a0 and b0 denote constants that depend on a, b, θ and θ0. Condition (18) then holds and
the optimal contract involves a windfall tax when proﬁts are high enough.
4.3 Political investment
There is an additional way that a ﬁrm may exert effort in order to increase its proﬁts: it can
invest in political support, either by lobbying politicians or by trying to inﬂuence the press, in
order to reduce the probability of expropriation.28 This can also be treated as a moral hazard
model,butinthiscaseeffortaffectstheprobabilityofexpropriationandhenceexpectedproﬁts,
rather than the probability of high proﬁt states directly.
4.3.1 The planner’s problem
Assumethenthatpoliticaleffortcanbedescribedby²andthatexpectedproﬁtsareΠe ≡Πe(x,²),
which we assume satisﬁes:
∂Πe
∂²
≥0,
∂2Πe
∂²2 <0,
∂2Πe
∂v∂²
>0,
∂3Πe
∂v2∂²
>0
and where ∂Πe/∂² = 0 for v ≤ 0 because Πe(v,²) = v for v ≤ 0.29 Using the ﬁrst order approach,
the problem for the planner can be stated as:
min
{Rc(v),²}
Z £
µ(Rc(v)−I)+(1−µ){Πe(Rc(v)−I,²)−(v −I)}
¤
f (v)dv (19a)
s.t.
Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I,²)f (v)dv ≥k², (19b)
Z
∂Πe
∂²
(R(v)−I,²)f (v)dv =k (19c)
0≤Rc(v)≤ v. (19d)
Denoting by γ > 0 the multiplier associated with (19b), which will hold with equality, and by
τ>0 the multiplier associated with (19c), we have that the Lagrangian of the problem is:
L =
Z £
µ(Rc(v)−I)+(1−µ){Πe(Rc(v)−I,²)−(v −I)}
¤
f (v)dv
−γ
·Z
Πe(Rc(v)−I)f (v)dv −k²
¸
−τ
Z
∂Πe
∂²
(Rc(v)−I,²)f (v)dv. (20)
28This section was suggested by our discussant Richard Zeckhauser at the Natural Resources and Populism Con-
ference.
29In an abuse of notation we have written
∂Πe
∂v for the partial derivative with respect to the ﬁrst argument of Πe.
26The ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. to ², and using (19c), lead to:
Z
(1−µ−γ)
∂Πe
∂²
(Rc(v)−I,²)f (v)dv +γk −τ
Z
∂2Πe
∂²2 (Rc(v)−I,²)f (v)dv =
(1−µ)k −τ
Z
∂2Πe
∂²2 (Rc(v)−I,²)f (v)dv
from which we derive an expression for τ:
τ=
(1−µ)k
R ∂2Πe
∂²2 (Rc(v)−I,²)f (v)dv
<0.
Now consider the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to R(v):
µ+(1−µ−γ)
∂Πe
∂v
(Rc(v)−I,²)=τ
∂2Πe
∂v∂²
(Rc(v)−I,²). (21)
Recall that 0 < µ < 1, that τ < 0, and that ∂Πe/∂v > 0 and ∂2Πe/∂v∂² < 0, and therefore γ >
1−µ>0. Now consider the function:
H (R(v))≡τ
∂2Πe
∂v∂²
(Rc(v)−I,²)−(1−µ−γ)
∂Πe
∂v
(Rc(v)−I,²),
where (21) is equivalent to H (R(v)) = µ. The conditions we imposed at the beginning of the
section ensure that ∂H (v)/∂v <0. Let M be the value where H (v)=µ. Then if v > M, we have
that the Lagrangian is maximized at R(v) = M, and if v ≤ M, the Lagrangian is maximized at
R(v)= v.
We have shown that there is a bound M such that the optimal contract is:
R(v)=



v if v ≤ M,
M if v > M.
Hence, in contrast to the case of moral hazard, in the case of political investment, the plan-
ner does not provide incentives to the ﬁrm, except in the range v ∈ [0,M]. The reason is that
effort affects the probability of expropriation across all states, but does not increase the proba-
bility of higher income states v, hence there is no conﬂict between reducing the probability of
expropriation by limiting R(v) and providing incentives in order to increase the probability of
higher states. The resulting contract belongs to the family of threshold contracts that are opti-
mal in the absence of moral hazard, even though the threshold itself will usually be different.
275 Conclusion
Developing countries need foreign investment in order to develop their natural resources. In
order to attract investment, they offer favorable conditions. When prices rise and revenues in-
creasebeyondexpectations,thereareoftencallstochangethetermsoftheoriginalcontracts,or
to expropriate the investment and appropriate the windfall proﬁts. This can be costly because
the investor will try to defend the original contract in local and international courts. Moreover,
there will be less investment in the next price cycle. We have proposed an alternative contract
thatimproveswelfarebyreducingtheattractionofexpropriationbyloweringproﬁtsinthegood
states of the world. This implies that there is a smaller cost of expropriation directly, because
there will be less expropriation, and indirectly, because the expropriated assets are less prof-
itable and therefore worth less to the foreign ﬁrm, which will not ﬁght as forcefully to retain the
project.
Wehaveshownthatinthecaseofhighdemandprojects,whicharealwaysproﬁtable(though
some states may be better than others), the optimal contract can be achieved by a present-
value-of-revenue (PVR) auction and there will be no expropriation. In the case in which the
project is proﬁtable in expected value, but has bad states in which it never recovers the invest-
ment, the ﬁrst best is achieved by setting a cap on proﬁts, and this can be implemented fairly
easily via an auction. We have shown that this is analogous to a lump sum windfall tax on prof-
its. Next, we showed that in the case when the government has the possibility of subsidizing the
ﬁrm in the bad states of the world by relaxing regulations, the ﬁrst best is achieved by a system
of subsidies in bad states of the world and caps on proﬁts on good states. Again, we found that
the ﬁrst best can be implemented via an auction. We examined the case in which the ﬁrm can
invest in lobbying or other political activities (regional subsidies, for example) and show that
the optima contract is of the same type as before.
The most interesting case, however is when there is moral hazard and the ﬁrm can perform
unobservable (or partially observable) effort that increases the likelihood of the high revenue
states. Heretheplannermustprovideincentives,whichimpliesthataconstantcaponrevenues
isinappropriate. Theoptimalcontractinvolvesprogressivetaxationofrevenuesaboveacertain
cap, of revenues, thus providing incentives to attain higher revenue states while reducing the
attraction of expropriation and its associated costs.
Note however that all these measures: lump sum windfall proﬁts or progressive taxation,
must be incorporated in the original contracts and must not be imposed ex post: in that case it
corresponds to the standard natural resource contract. Finally, we showed that there is positive
welfare gain from our contract, and that the gain is due solely to the better behavior of the
government in the good states of the world, above the cap.
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29Appendix
A The effect of a positive expropriation probability: a simple
model
Consider the following simple model that describes the effect of potential expropriation on in-
vestment. For simplicity, we assume the the ﬁrm’s present discounted proﬁts, as a function of
price p and unobservable effort F, are given by:
Π(p,F)= pq(F)−F,
with q > 0, q0 > 0 and q00 < 0. Price uncertainty is described by a probability density g(p) with
c.d.f.G(p).
No Expropriation
Rents are dissipated via an upfront payment to the government in a competitive auction; all
ﬁrms are the same.
Once it wins the auction, the ﬁrm solves:
max
F
Z
pq(F)g(p)dp −F
which leads to
q0(F)=
1
R ∞
0 pg(p)dp
. (22)
Denote the optimal value of F by Fne.
Expropriation
If p > ¯ p, the ﬁrm is expropriated and receives no income at all. The ﬁrm is aware of this
when deciding how much to invest in effort, so that the price distribution it considers has mass
1−G( ¯ p)>0 at p =0 and density g(p) for 0< p < ¯ p.
The same derivation that led to (22) now yields
q0(F)=
1
R ¯ p
0 pg(p)dp
. (23)
Denote the solution by Fe. Since, trivially, the denominator in (23) is smaller than the one
in (22), concavity of q(F) implies that Fe <Fne.
As before, ex ante rents are dissipated via an upfront payment to the government and all
ﬁrms are the same. The upfront payment that wins is smaller than in the case without expro-
priation,fortworeasons. First,theﬁrmexpectsfewerrentssinceitrealizesthereisaprobability
30ofbeingexpropriated. EveniftheﬁrmexertseffortFne, theupfrontpaymenttothegovernment
by the ﬁrm would be smaller, by exactly the amount the government expects to collect via ex-
propriation. Furthermore, as Fe < Fne we also have an efﬁciency loss to society, since the ﬁrm
exerts less effort and therefore social welfare—which is equal to the sum of what the govern-
ment collects from the ﬁrm up-front and via expropriation—is lower.
Result 8 Expropriation when price realizations are high lowers social welfare because it induces
the ﬁrm to do less unobservable, yet socially desirable, investment upfront.
Given the inefﬁciencies introduced by expropriation, is there a way of designing a contract
that reduces the impact on investment? The following sections explore this issue.
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